(1) THE WAKING STATE In neurological practice, consciousness is often equated with the waking state, and with the ability to respond to stimuli in the integrated manner we associate with this state. This ability is a matter of degree: a broad range of conscious states extends from normal waking through sleep into coma.
(2) PERCEPTUAL AWARENESS We sometimes use "consciousness" to denote a person's or animal's current perceptual awareness, the deliverance of sight, hearing, and the other senses. Although some argue that the perceptual responsiveness of animals does not necessarily imply perceptual awareness, awareness is often assumed, just as it is in the case of other human minds. The distinction between senses (1) and (2) might be characterised as the distinction between the capacity for and the content of consciousness.
(3) INTENTIONAL STATES Any "intentional state" in the technical sense used in philosophy,'5 that is-any mental state with propositional content such as a belief, fear, hope, expectation, or purpose-is potentially conscious. In this third sense "consciousness" is coextensive with "mind". Self consciousness is also a complex concept:
(a) Colloquial use In its everyday use self consciousness implies easily provoked embarrassment in social settings.
(b) The concept ofself Animals and children can be described as "self conscious" if they can recognise themselves-for example, in mirrors. This ability implies some mental representation of "self'.
(c) The concept of experience A more exacting criterion for "self consciousness" is the possession of a concept of experience, the "awareness of awareness". The colloquial sense of self consciousness is linked to this concept: we become self conscious when we are excessively aware that we are the target of others' attention.
(d) Selfknowledge Like consciousness itself, self consciousness has an extended sense. It can refer to any kind of self knowledge, exemplified, for example, by autobiography.
Recent advances
Recent interest has centred on consciousness in its first two senses, and on self consciousness in senses (b) and (c).
CONSCIOUSNESS: THE WAKING STATE
The regulation of sleep and waking, and their pathological disruption by coma, epilepsy, and sleep disorders, are traditional concerns of clinical neuroscience. The concept of the ascending reticular activating system, developed by Moruzzi and Magoun in the 1940s,'6 implied that the capacity for consciousness depends on activity in the brain stem and diencephalon, which exert a powerful influence on the cerebral hemispheres. This key insight holds good to the present, although it is now clear that the activating system has a complex internal structure, comprising interacting nuclei with distinctive pharmacological and physiological properties. '7 Of the three principal states of arousal-waking, slow wave sleep (SWS), and rapid eye movement sleep (REM)-REM is the best understood.'7 Jouvet reported in 1962 that REM periods in the forebrain are abolished after brain stem transection just above the junction between pons and midbrain. 17 Subsequent work has shown that a subset of cholinergic neurons in the pedunculopontine and laterodorsal tegmental nuclei of the upper pons become active selectively in REM. These "REM on" neurons innervate other brain stem structures widely, mainly via muscarinic receptors, thereby orchestrating the REM associated phenomena of muscular hypotonia, rapid eye movements, and EEG desynchronisation. 17 Activity among noradrenergic neurons in the locus coeruleus, serotonergic neurons in the raphe nuclei, and histaminergic neurons in the posterior hypothalamus helps to terminate REM, and persists both during the rhythmic thalamocortical oscillations of SWS and the typically desynchronised EEG activity of the waking state. The firing of noradrenergic neurons in particular is fastest, during waking.'7 Activity in cholinergic neurons in the pons and basal forebrain is a feature of REM and waking, both desynchronised states in the EEG, but not of SWS. The primary site of initiation of SWS if there is one remains elusive.
There is growing, although still incomplete, knowledge of the neuronal mechanisms underlying the cerebral rhythmic activities detected by the EEG, which correlate with states of arousal.'8 Both the properties of individual neurons and their organisation into neuronal networks contribute to the genesis of these rhythms. There is evidence for the fundamental importance of a transition between a hyperpolarised state of thalamocortical cells, associated with "burst activity" and SWS, and a relatively depolarised state in which thalamic neurons are tonically active and function as "relay cells". '8 Cerebral metabolism oscillates predictably during the orderly physiological succession of REM, SWS, and waking; it is about 25% lower in SWS than in REM or in the waking state.'9 It is more depressed in coma; the lowest values, around 30-50% of control results, have been reported in the persistent vegetative state, in which the sleep-wake cycle is re-established after a period of coma, without evidence of perceptual awareness.202' The neuropathology of the persistent vegetative state shows damage outside the brain stem structures which regulate the sleep-wake cycle: cortical laminar necrosis, diffuse hemispheric leucoencephalopathy or axonal injury, or extensive thalamic injury. 22 The development of objective description of conscious level with instruments such as the Glasgow coma scale has been invaluable clinically, allowing reliable serial comparisons. 23 The objective assessment of consciousness, however, is occasionally misleading when subjective awareness persists despite gross motor impairment for example in the "locked in" state-or, rarely, under supposed general anaesthesia. 24 The basis of the subjective content of consciousness is the second focus of current interest.
CONSCIOUSNESS: PERCEPTUAL AWARENESS
Although some neural processes, for example visual and auditory perception, typically generate vivid subjective awareness, others, such as the autonomic control of the circulation, as a rule do not. This distinction has been extended recently by the discovery that sensation, adequate to guide movement, can occur without conscious awareness. The most closely studied example of this phenomenon is blindsight.
Persons with blindsight lack conscious vision, usually in one hemifield, as a result of a lesion in the striate cortex, but are nevertheless able to guess the position, direction of motion, orientation, and colour of objects presented in their blind field well above chance.6 Whether this ability depends on activation of subcortical structures such as the superior colliculus, to which there is a direct retinal projection, or on direct or indirect activation of surviving extrastriate cortical visual areas, is controversial. It is, however, an attractive hypothesis that the neural substrate for the formation of a conscious or "explicit" visual percept is selectively disabled by the striate lesion, leaving intact some unconscious or "implicit" visual abilities.
There are other disorders of the cortical visual areas in which subjects lack explicit access to preserved implicit knowledge about, for example, the size and shape of objects and the identity or familiarity of faces. 25 A recent experiment by Cowey and Stoerig attempted to "ask" macaque monkeys, from which the striate cortex of the left hemisphere had been removed several years before, whether their remaining visual capacity in the affected field was "blind".26 On light trials the monkeys were trained to press an illuminated target presented in any of five positions in their normal hemifield. On blank trials, when the monkey anticipated a light stimulus in the normal hemifield but none was presented, the monkeys were trained to press a separate panel. On probe trials, an illuminated target which the monkeys had proved able to detect in previous experiments analagous to those used to demonstrate human blindsight-was presented in the monkeys' blind field. The animals responded to these stimuli in their blind hemifield by pressing the blank trial panel, suggesting that they, like human patients, lack conscious visual awareness of stimuli which they can nevertheless respond to in their blindfields.
A somewhat similar dissociation between explicit and implicit processes has emerged from the study of amnesia.6 Patients with the amnesic syndrome, caused either by bilateral mesial temporal or diencephalic pathology, are unable to acquire new episodic memories. They can, however, demonstrate an ability to learn-for example, acquiring new motor skills successfully, despite the lack of conscious recall of any previous exposure to the task.
Such work is furnishing examples of implicit cognitive abilities which survive lesions that abolish conscious perception and recollection. These phenomena may permit a clearer definition of the neural substrates of awareness. What is the relation between such perceptual awareness and self consciousness? SELF CONSCIOUSNESS In 1970 Gallup reported that chimpanzees, but not macaque or rhesus monkeys, learn to recognise their mirror images.27 He inferred this initially from observations of their spontaneous behaviour, noting that the monkeys persistently directed social behaviour towards their reflections, whereas the chimpanzees used the mirror for detailed self inspection. Experimental confirmation was provided by anaesthetising the animals and marking them with an odourless non-irritant dye in positions which were invisible without the aid of a mirror. On seeing their reflections the chimpanzees inspected the marks closely, first in the mirror and then by touching them directly; the monkeys never did so. Gallup interpreted this result as evidence that chimpanzees have a concept of self.
Children recognise themselves in mirrors at around the age of 18 months.28 Recent research in developmental psychology has explored the steps by which the relatively simple concept of self evidenced by mirror self recognition evolves into a "theory of mind", of the kind possessed by average five year old children, allowing them to assign complex mental states, such as belief, accurately to others and to themselves.29 Whereas self recognition implies an "idea of me" which may involve no more than a representation of the subject's body, the five year old's theory of mind suggests a complex concept of experience, an "awareness of awareness". There is current interest in the hypothesis that the primary cognitive deficit in those with autism is failure to develop a normal "theory of mind".29 DOES consciousness in the senses of self recognition and possession of a theory of mind, the results discussed above suggest not. Macaque monkeys evidently wake and sleep, and the experiment by Cowey and Stoerig26 described above suggests that they distinguish conscious percepts from unconsciously processed visual information much as we do. If so, they are conscious in our first and second senses of this term. They are not, however, capable of mirror self recognition, and there is no satisfactory evidence that they possess a developed theory of mind. If so, they are not self conscious in the key senses (b) and (c) defined above.
THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS
A comprehensive biological theory of consciousness would specify its mechanisms, functions, phylogeny, and ontogeny.28 This goal is remote. However, recent authors have tentatively suggested mechanisms for perceptual awareness which are in principle open to experimental test. Most proposals originate in visual science and draw with varying emphasis on three key ideas: (1) the importance of re-entrant connections among disparate cortical areas (re-entrant connections run from a given area, "B", back to an area upstream, "A", which contributes to the innervation of "B", creating a neuronal loop); (2) the role of temporal synchronisation in the activity of distributed neurons; (3) the critical function of certain specified forebrain structures in the genesis of consciousness.
Zeki has built on the evidence of functional specialisation in the numerous cortical visual areas-area V4, for instance, playing a key role in the perception of colour, V5 in the perception of motion, and V3 in perception of orientation (figure)-to suggest that bidirectional interconnections between the visual areas, permitting the formation of networks containing neurons with synchronised activity, are the precondition for conscious vision. Milner has postulated that the visual pathway subserving object recognition, which runs from the occipital to the temporal lobe, provides the basis for subjective visual awareness, whereas the occipitoparietal visual pathway subserving action operates without exciting visual consciousness."1 Edelman and his colleagues have used computer simulations to demonstrate the power of re-entrant connections to unify neuronal activity in disparate cortical visual areas.5 They have argued that the emergence of conscious perception from re-entrant activity in the visual system depends on additional interaction with neural networks subserving memory and value.5 Although the finding of synchronous oscillations in the activity of widely distributed neuronal groups has evidently caught the imagination of theorists of consciousness, it would be premature to conclude that synchronous oscillation is the mechanism of consciousness; such oscillations may prove to be a ubiquitous feature of cerebral function.'2 Moreover, whereas the proposals we have singled out emphasise the importance of richly integrated networks, it may be possible to influence the content of consciousness by modulation of relatively local neuronal activity. For example, stimulation of small clusters of directionally sensitive cells in area MT of the monkey causes the animal to "report" that an array of randomly moving dots is moving in the preferred direction of the stimulated cells, presumably by generating an illusion of movement." Similarly, there is some evidence that activity in areas V3 and V5 alone, in the absence of primary visual cortex, is sufficient to induce conscious perception of movement.34
Philosophical doubts
The central philosophical problem raised by recent advances in neuroscience is whether the elucidation of any physiological mechanism could provide a complete and satisfying explanation for perceptual awareness. This problem has been illustrated by various "thought experiments": how far, for instance, can scientific investigation take us towards an understanding of the subjective experience of an animal equipped with a sense we lack, such as the echolocatory sense of bats and dolphins?35 Would a blind student of the visual system always be denied a dimension of understanding which the sighted naturally possess? Are there, in short, aspects of consciousness which are accessible to a subject of experience but which are in principle beyond the scientist's ken?
Philosophers continue to offer a broad range of responses to this issue. Churchland and others have argued that the "problem" of consciousness is a product of conceptual confusion: it will melt away as scientific progress clarifies the underlying biological and functional reality of human psychology;"3Searle has championed the autonomy of psychological concepts, but writes optimistically that "the view of reality as entirely physical" is consistent with "the view that the world really contains subjective conscious states";7 McGinn has proposed, more pessimistically, that whereas mental events and their physical correlates are necessarily connected, our insuperable intellectual limitations will block any fundamental insights into the connection.4 Despite the lack of consensus about the mind-brain question in contemporary philosophy, there is an invigorating determination to do justice both to the rich texture of experience and to its intimate but revealable relation to neuronal events.
Conclusion
This review is highly selective. We have neglected several areas of relevant research-such as the study of attention36 and anaesthesia24-and have emphasised physiological approaches at the expense of the functional theories emerging from the disciplines of cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence.2 We have tried to convey the grow- 
